Managing Fisheries on the High Seas
For centuries, freedom of the high seas has been one of the most sacrosanct tenets of international law, and fishing is one of the activities which can be pursued by all. Unhindered fishing, as has been well-documented, leads to over-exploitation and depletion of fish stocks.
Since the late 1970s, most coastal nations have claimed an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) over waters out to 200 nautical miles from their coast, and in this area they have sole jurisdiction over fish stocks. Since some fish stocks, however, "straddle" the waters of the EEZs and the high seas (i.e., international waters beyond EEZs), most coastal nations have a vested interest in some regulation of high seas fishing.
In an attempt to minimize overfishing on the high seas, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires that states cooperate in the conservation and management of fish stocks. This is primarily done through the establishment of regional fisheries organizations (RFOs). As of 2001 there were 23 such organizations dealing with marine fisheries. They are of two types -
- Those that deal with specific species, such as the Commission for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).
- Those that are regionally oriented such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(NAFO) and the Commission for Eastern Central Atlantic Fisheries (CECAF).
Nonetheless, there are still some species or areas which are not covered, and so the number of RFOs continues to grow. The responsibilities of these organizations vary, but generally they conduct scientific analyses of the status of fish stocks, establish limits on the amount of fish that can be caught or the number of vessels that are allowed to fish, and define the types of fishing gear that may be used. Some have set up programmes to inspect fishing activities at sea or have adopted trade restrictions against fish which are caught by vessels not observing the relevant management rules.
- The ability of RFOs to manage fisheries on the high seas is severely constrained in practice by a number of factors:
- Ocean areas are vast: CCAMLR, for example, is responsible for managing fisheries over the
entire Antarctic Ocean, and ICCAT covers the waters from Iceland to Cape Horn.
- Surveillance and inspection programmes are problematic to operate so there is often very little
monitoring of what vessels do on the high seas. Even within their own EEZs, where countries
have a direct interest in ensuring the rules are observed, effective programmes are costly and
difficult to manage.
- The objectives of RFOs are frequently vague. One of the goals of ICCAT, for example, is
to keep tuna stocks "at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and
other purposes." Countries may not agree on what this means in practice, or the best way to
achieve it; should the impact of fishing on other species be considered? how much risk should
be taken that the fish stock will collapse? Differing views on these and other aspects of
management can lead to widely contrasting approaches to decision-making on quotas.
- Even if an RFO is able to agree on the level of quotas for fish stocks, equally difficult decisions
are necessary on how to allocate that quota among the member countries. Most organizations
do this based upon historical catch records, so that each country has a fixed percentage of the
quota. But what about countries which have not hitherto fished a particular stock but wish to
develop their fishery? This has been one of the most divisive issues in several RFOs,
including ICCAT, NAFO and the CCSBT.
- Under international law, a country is not formally bound by the decisions of an international
organization to which it does not belong. Consequently, only countries which are members of
an RFO have to abide by its decisions. This creates an enormous loophole in fisheries
management law, for vessels flying flags of non-member countries can fish virtually without
restriction, paying no attention to management and conservation measures. Ship-owners in
member countries can, and do, transfer their vessels to these "flags of convenience" in order
to evade restrictions.
- Each regional organization has a unique set of problems, depending on its history and
members. For example:
- A long and sometimes violent confrontation began in NAFO between Canada and the
European Union (EU) in 1986. The EU began giving itself autonomous quotas for several
fish stocks, far larger than its official allocation under NAFO. After several years of
rancorous arguments, and steep declines in some stocks, the EU agreed to abide by NAFO
decisions. But in 1995, Canada forcibly seized a Spanish vessel, the Estai, in international
waters, alleging that it was overfishing. The resulting international crisis was only resolved
by the implementation by NAFO of a comprehensive control and surveillance programme,
including satellite transponders on 100% and human observers on 30% of vessels fishing in
the NAFO Regulatory Area. Similar schemes have begun to be adopted in other RFOs.
- Swordfish in the North Atlantic has been over-fished, requiring decreases in the quotas
established by ICCAT. The major fisher on the stock, Spain, began in the late 1980s to
increase its fishing effort on swordfish in the South Atlantic, where it has come into conflict
with countries such as Brazil, Namibia and South Africa which want to develop their
domestic fisheries. These countries have demanded an increased share of the quota while
Spain, represented by the EU in ICCAT, has refused to reduce its share. ICCAT has
established a working group to work out a new allocation key but the situation is delicate. If
no compromise is found, some countries may withdraw from ICCAT to set up a separate
organization or else simply transfer their vessels to flags of convenience.
- Southern bluefin tuna is another depleted species. Japan, Australia and New Zealand
formed the CCSBT in 1994 and Korea has recently joined, leaving Taiwan and Indonesia as
non-members which fish for bluefin. Low quotas prompted Japan to unilaterally initiate a
research programme for the equivalent of about 30% of their quota. In July 1999, Australia
and New Zealand initiated proceedings before the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS), demanding that Japan immediately cease its experimental fishing and
respect its national quota allocation. The Tribunal provisionally ruled that the three parties
were not to conduct any experimental fishing unless it was either with the agreement of the
other members of the CCSBT or else counted against the national allocation. As of 2001,
the CCSBT was still discussing the best way to obtain the scientific information on the
stock which is needed for proper assessment and management.
- The UN Agreement on Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, concluded
in 1995, entered into force in December of 2001. This Agreement will considerably strengthen
the role of RFOs in the management of stocks on the high seas. Among its provisions:
- only member countries of an RFO are allowed to fish in the area covered by that RFO;
- non-member countries may not authorize their vessels to fish in the area covered by the
RFO;
- member countries must agree on quotas and allocation of catches;
- member countries may only allow their vessels to fish if they are able to effectively control
their activities.
- However, the international community cannot oblige a country to join an RFO, or to ratify the
UN Agreement, so these provisions are not universally binding. They are, nonetheless, a step
in putting international pressure upon certain countries to control the activities of their fleets.
Uncooperative non-member countries can also have specific fish products banned from import
into RFO member countries; such a measure has been implemented by ICCAT.
- Many RFOs are already adapting themselves to conform with the new international standards
for fisheries management that have been included in the UN Agreement, such as application of
the precautionary approach, control and surveillance programmes, criteria for the entry of new
members and others. Thus, the influence of the Agreement will extend to members of the
RFOs even if they have not ratified the Agreement themselves.
Decisions of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, available at
http://www.itlos.org/.
Documents from ICCAT, available at
http://www.iccat.es.
Documents from NAFO, available at
http://www.nafo.ca.
Home pages of other regional fisheries organizations, listed at http://www.fao.org/fi/body/rfb/index.htm.
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